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Brexit	pushes	European	lawmakers	to	reform	the	EU
Brexit	has	pushed	European	lawmakers	to	seriously	talk	about	rebuilding	the	EU.	In	December
2016,	the	Committee	on	Constitutional	Affairs	of	the	European	Parliament	endorsed	a	report	on
adjustments	to	the	institutional	set-up	of	the	EU,	which	was	then	ratified	by	the	full	house.	This
article	argues	that	calls	for	democratising	the	EU	political	system	have	to	be	addressed
immediately,	and	that	priority	should	be	given	to	reforms	of	the	European	elections.	Miriam	Sorace
advocates	for	a	uniform	Open-List	Proportional	Representation	System	with	small	constituencies
and	the	possibility	for	national	parties	to	run	all	over	Europe	as	the	‘ideal-	type’.	She	then	outlines	its	beneficial
effects	in	terms	of	accountability	and	the	formation	of	a	European	public	sphere.
Members	of	the	European	Parliament	take	part	in	a	voting	session,	in	the	European	Parliament	in	Strasbourg.	Credits:
FREDERICK	FLORIN/AFP/Getty	Images
One	of	the	essential	flaws	in	EU	democracy	relates	to	European	Parliament	(EP)	elections.	All	scholars	looking
into	the	EU	democratic	deficit	variously	mention	a	missing	‘public	sphere’,	an	absent	‘EU	demos’,	and	low
‘political	contestation’	(Hix	&	Follesdal	2006;	Hix	2008).	To	cut	a	long	story	short,	EU	scholars	doubt	that	the
interests	of	EU	voters	on	EU	policies	can	be	appropriately	voiced	or	that	they	can	be	appropriately	translated	into
EU	policy	outputs	under	the	current	institutional	framework.	This	situation	needs	to	change,	and	it	needs	to
change	soon,	if	the	populist	resurgence	of	recent	years	is	of	any	indication.	Many	scholars	indicate	that	to	help
EU	voters	have	more	control	over	EP	politicians	–	and	to	create	a	European	public	sphere	–	it	is	important	to
redress	flaws	in	EP	elections	(Hix	&	Hagemann	2009,	Hobolt	2012,	Hobolt	&	Spoon	2012).	Establishing	a
common	electoral	law	incentivising	EU-specific	political	contestation	is	often	seen	as	a	necessary	step.
The	current	system:	a	series	of	domestic	‘mid-term’	elections.
Currently,	our	representatives	to	the	European	Parliament	(MEPs)	are	elected	in	a	series	of	‘parallel’	elections,
run	and	regulated	by	the	sovereign	member	states,	and,	as	a	result,	dominated	by	national	parties	and	their
‘domestic	squabbles’.	The	EU	Treaties	do	not	specify	an	EU-wide	electoral	rule:	article	14	TEU	and	articles	20
and	223	TFEU	mainly	record	an	aspiration	to	‘uniform	procedures’	or	‘principles’	and	simply	demand	five	year
terms,	direct	universal	suffrage	and	free	and	secret	ballots.	The	Treaties	grant	the	EP	the	opportunity	to	draft
reform	proposals	to	regulate	EP	elections,	but	the	final	word	on	this	matter	belongs	to	the	Council	of	Ministers.
The	difficulties	in	finding	an	agreement	among	all	members	meant	that	the	only	concrete	translation	of	these
aspirations	for	uniformity	has	been	the	baseline	requirement	of	proportional	representation	(PR)	with	maximum
5%	thresholds,	enshrined	in	Council	Decision	2002/772/EC.
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Throughout	the	EU,	therefore,	we	are	currently	using	national	elections	to	fill	supranational	positions.	This	has
resulted	in	an	incoherent	and	fragmented	party	system,	which	is	not	an	ideal	situation	for	multilevel	polities	like
the	EU,	as	it	hurts	the	legitimacy	and	consequent	application	of	policy	outputs	(Filipov	and	Ordershook	2004).
This	flaw,	according	to	prominent	EU	scholars,	is	what	leads	to	low	turnouts	and	high	instances	of	protest	voting
in	EP	elections	(Hix	&	Marsh	2010;	Hobolt	2012),	winning	them	the	title	of	‘second-order’	elections.	Studies	have
indeed	demonstrated	that	substantive	discussion	of	EU	policy-making	is	mostly	absent	during	EP	elections
(Davidson-Schmich	&	Vladescu	2012),	and	that	European	voters	do	not	know	what	stance	political	parties	have
on	EU	issues	(McElroy	&	Kritzinger	2012).	We,	therefore,	cannot	say	to	have	full	control	over	our	MEPs:	we	can
aspire,	at	most,	to	‘indirect’	monitoring	via	the	national	party	leadership.
How	can	we	improve	EU	elections?
The	Politics	and	Institutions	focus	group	of	the	1989	Generation	Initiative	is	currently	working	at	a	courageous
proposal	that	would	substantially	change	the	way	we	elect	our	MEPs.	The	proposal	advocates	a	uniform	electoral
law	blending	supranational	and	local	control,	as	it	envisages	an	EU-wide	system	of	proportional	representation
with	open	lists	and	small	constituencies.	According	to	the	proposal,	each	member	state	will	retain	the	number	of
EP	seats	it	currently	has	but	each	political	party	can	compete	in	other	member	states	as	well,	and	it	will	be
incentivised	to	do	so	if	it	wants	to	win	more	seats	in	the	EP.	The	option	to	run	across	several	member	states	will
encourage	the	formation	of	an	EU-wide	party	system.	Parties	will	be	obliged	to	pick	a	list	of	‘local’	candidates	in
all	the	constituencies	of	the	EU	in	which	they	wish	to	compete,	to	facilitate	contacts	and	communication	with
constituents.	Studies	by	academics	(e.g	Hix	and	Hagemann	(2009),	Bright	et	al	(2016))	have	already	made
similar	proposals	and	identified	similar	elements	of	an	EU-wide	electoral	rule	as	necessary	to	redress	the	EU
democratic	deficit.
Open	list	proportional	electoral	rules	have	beneficial	effects	on	turnout,	satisfaction	with	democracy	and	contacts
with	representatives	(Blais	&	Aarts	2006;	Farrell	&	McAllister	2006).	They	foster	intra-party	competition	(Farrell	&
Shugart	2012),	and,	with	it,	superior	incentives	to	politicians	to	share	information,	and	to	be	in	close	contact	with
voters	(Hix	&	Hagemann	2009;	Farrell	&	Scully	2010).	Studies	of	electoral	rules	in	addition	find	that	open	lists
should	be	coupled	with	small	(4-10	seater)	constituencies	to	be	effective,	as	small	district	magnitudes	would
avoid	that	open	list	competition	reduces	to	country-level	personality	contests	among	top	party	politicians	(Carey
and	Shugart	1995;	Hix	&	Hagemann	2009).	An	analysis	of	the	2004	European	election	demonstrated	that	voters
in	open-list	with	small	district	electoral	systems	were	in	closer	contact	with	MEPs	and	were	better	informed	about
the	2004	EP	election	(Hix	&	Hagemann	2009).	Applying	this	electoral	rule	uniformly	across	the	EU	territory	–	and
allowing	political	parties	to	run	in	all	EU	constituencies	–	would	boost	knowledge	of	EU	issues	and	policy-making,
increase	satisfaction	with	EU	democracy,	improve	participation	in	EP	elections,	enhance	contacts	between	voters
and	MEPs,	and	potentially	help	to	quench	popular	frustration	with	the	EU.
It	is	heartening	that	leading	European	politicians,	emboldened	by	Brexit,	are	currently	talking	about	converting	the
73	UK	seats	in	the	European	Parliament	into	‘supranational’	seats	in	2019.	This	indicates	some	political
willingness	to	viscerally	transform	the	EP	electoral	system.	Let’s	hope	the	impetus	for	EP	elections	reform	will
grow,	together	with	a	desire	for	truly	European	elections,	so	that	citizens	can	take	back	control	(actually	and
constructively,	this	time).
This	article	first	appeared	on	EUROPP	and	it	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor
of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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making	and	her	research	focuses	on	the	European	Parliament	and	on	the	EU	democratic	deficit.	She	is	also	a
delegate	in	the	Politics	&	Institutions	Taskforce	at	the	1989	Generation	Initiative.
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